docs: Tailscale SSH ACL set to accept
Tailnet SSH policy changed from the default action:"check" to accept. The effective policy is now a single rule covering all tailnet nodes, with no expiry and port forwarding allowed, so the per-device ~12h grants and the browser re-auth prompt are gone. Verified unattended with BatchMode=yes: a plain command, a -L forward returning HTTP 302, and the Herdr fallback leg. Records the trade-off: check acted as a second factor, so a compromised tailnet device now reaches root on Unraid without a further step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- **[SERVICE]** Exit node advertised from Unraid as a fallback to the hAP, and approved in the Tailscale admin console the same day. The tailnet now has two exit nodes: `mikrotik-tailscale` (100.74.219.35, primary) and `xtrm-unraid` (100.100.208.69, fallback). Neither has been exercised in anger from the Mac — without `--exit-node-allow-lan-access` an exit node cuts the client's own LAN access.
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- Detail, including the root-only `AllowTcpForwarding` behaviour in Unraid's stock sshd config, in `docs/09-TAILSCALE-VPN.md`.
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### Network: Tailscale SSH ACL set to accept
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- **[NETWORK]** Tailnet SSH policy changed from Tailscale's default `action: "check"` to `accept` for `autogroup:member` -> `autogroup:self`. Before the change the control plane minted ~12 h per-device grants and prompted for browser re-auth when they lapsed, which would stall any unattended connection. Effective policy is now a single rule: accept for all 10 tailnet nodes, no expiry, with local and remote port forwarding and agent forwarding allowed.
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- **[NETWORK]** Verified unattended with `BatchMode=yes`: a plain command over Tailscale SSH, a `-L` port forward (HTTP 302 from the Unraid web UI) and the Herdr fallback leg all ran without a prompt.
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- Trade-off recorded in the docs: `check` acted as a second factor, so a compromised tailnet device now reaches root on Unraid without a further step. Accepted because every node in the tailnet is owner-controlled hardware.
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### Tooling: Unraid registered as a Herdr (hc) machine
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- **[SERVICE]** Unraid added to Herdr as the machine `unraid` (`hc` 0.1.17 on the remote). `herdr-core machine add` had been failing with `core did not start within 5 s`: `hc` puts its core socket under `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR`, which on Unraid is `/run/user/0` — a directory elogind creates and destroys per login session, so the socket disappeared the moment the session that started the core ended. The core kept running with an unlinked socket, and `core.log` stayed empty because the failure is client side.
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- **[SERVICE]** Fixed from the Mac only, via `~/.local/bin/herdr-via-unraid`, a `--via` transport that exports `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/var/run/herdr-rt` on every connection. Nothing on the server was changed. Uses key auth on 192.168.10.20:422 rather than Tailscale SSH, because `--via` needs a transport that asks nothing and the default tailnet ACL `check` would demand periodic browser re-auth.
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